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• Village governance in Indonesia
• Decentralisation and accountability
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Key themes
Summary 
Village underdevelopment is considered a major contributor to Indonesia’s high 
levels of inequality. Law No.6 / 2014 (‘Village Law’) on villages’ governance 
and finance is regarded as the most progressive policy in the history of local 
governance in Indonesia, and has great potential for rural development. 
This study investigates the implementation of the Village Law, asking whether 
it is functioning as an enabler or a constraint for more accountable governance. 
Indonesian non-governmental organisation PATTIRO carried out the study 
and visited six villages, which were selected as examples of good practice in 
governance.
The study finds that, overall, the law both enables and constrains positive 
changes towards more accountable governance. It is an enabler in that its 
stipulations have generally encouraged some village reforms, compared with 
the previous law, and has helped to increase national and district funds going to 
villages. 
But the law also constrains village governments from optimising their 
development programmes in various ways, including by imposing a complex 
reporting burden. It fails to define roles and responsibilities clearly and 
accurately, perpetuating ambiguities that impede better functioning and 
accountability. 
Citizen participation within the framework of the law is also not optimum: first 
the law does not enable all village citizens to monitor village elections; second, 
there are restrictions on who can participate in village forums (Musdes); third, 
implementation of the law limits the authority of ‘the village’, subordinating it 
to district government for governance and finance.
Based on these findings, PATTIRO offered recommendations for different 
government authorities for strengthening the Village Law’s implementation and 
has created research uptake spaces to share knowledge and practical experience 
of implementing the Village Law.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Study scope and report outline
Village underdevelopment is a key aspect of high 
inequality in Indonesia; rural areas experience far 
higher poverty than urban areas. With more than 
70,000 villages across 34 provinces, there are spatial 
inequalities not only between the rural and urban, but 
also between the east and the west (Gibson 2017). The 
underdevelopment of rural areas is regarded by some 
as a consequence of the minimal authority previously 
exercised by villages in the Indonesian governance 
system (Zakaria 2000; Antlov 2003). 
Against this background, the introduction of Law  
No.6 / 2014 on villages (hereafter called the Village 
Law) has significant potential for rural development. 
It is regarded as the most progressive policy in the 
history of local governance in Indonesia for two 
reasons. First, it establishes village authorities (Articles 
18–21) as responsible for the administration of village 
affairs, social and economic development, and the 
empowerment of the villagers based on community 
initiatives, customary law and local traditions. Second, 
it includes the Village Fund policy (Article 72), which 
allocates funding to village governments. In other 
words, the village government now has both the 
authority and resources necessary to govern its own 
affairs.
To ensure that increased decentralisation leads to 
increased democratisation, the Village Law recognises 
that village governance should be accountable 
to villagers by providing a framework for citizens’ 
participation in the planning and monitoring of local 
policies. However, legislative gaps and conflicting 
interpretations of the different authorities established 
under the law have led to patchy implementation. 
With this in mind, this study aimed to examine the 
implementation of the Village Law, and consider 
the circumstances under which it could help to give 
village governance – trapped for decades in political 
patrimonialism – a more democratic character. It also 
sought to explore the factors that influence individual 
village heads to become reformers. 
The study was part of a wider applied research process 
implemented by PATTIRO, a national Indonesian 
NGO which carries out research, policy advocacy 
and technical assistance on the governance of public 
service delivery and community participation. With 
its particularly strong focus on social accountability, 
transparency and public finance management reform, 
and its extensive network of branches in 17 regions, 
PATTIRO is well-positioned in the Indonesian context 
to use its research as a bridge to engage both local 
government and civil society actors, and to engage 
with a range of stakeholders at local and national 
levels.
In the context of PATTIRO’s wider work, this study set 
out both to learn about Village Law implementation 
and to influence this by working towards a shared, 
consistent understanding of the law among 
government and civil society stakeholders at the 
local level, thereby promoting good practice in local 
governance. In particular, the research and uptake 
process aimed at a substantive improvement in Village 
Law implementation in a way that ensures more open 
and participatory governance of villages, including 
through the allocation of funding and resources to be 
used by local communities. 
The study team at PATTIRO first set out to 
purposively identify and examine examples of good 
practice in accountable village governance. They 
then used the lessons drawn from these examples 
to develop recommendations for improvements 
to the implementation of the Village Law. These 
recommendations formed the basis of advocacy and 
uptake activities with key stakeholders in Village Law 
implementation – ranging from village-level officials 
involved in the study to national policy-makers.
The remainder of Section 1 continues with a brief 
discussion of the theoretical framework for the 
research, its methodology, and the research questions 
covering village governance and finance; Section 2 
sketches the key aspects of the Village Law in these two 
areas. 
This study set out both to learn about Village Law implementation and to 
influence this by working towards a shared, consistent understanding of 
the law among government and civil society stakeholders at the local level, 
thereby promoting good practice in local governance
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Section 3 presents a selection of the study’s findings, 
focusing on the intertwined relationship between village 
governance and village finance. It identifies some of 
the implementation challenges that exist when local 
government actors who have reformist records or are 
otherwise notable for good practice in leadership for 
community development engage with the new legal 
structures of decentralised governance. 
Section 4 discusses the findings: is the Village Law 
an enabler or constraint for decentralised good 
governance? How do the lowest tiers of decentralised 
governance relate to each other, and what impact does 
this have on the autonomy of village governance, and 
on the agency of village leaders?
Section 5 reflects on PATTIRO’s engagement and 
uptake strategy, which involved creating spaces for the 
local governance stakeholders involved in the study 
and others with an interest in accountable governance 
agendas to learn about the findings and incorporate 
them into their Village Law implementation practices. 
1.2 Theoretical framework
Encouraging the accountability of village governance 
through community involvement in the development 
planning and monitoring process is seen by some 
(e.g. Antlöv and Eko 2012) as an effort to strengthen 
democracy at village level. In this view, the village 
citizen is framed as an active participant in village 
governance processes. However, in the Indonesian 
context, injecting any citizen participation into village 
governance can be challenging, considering the 
country’s history of strong political patrimonialism. 
First coined by Max Weber, ‘patrimonialism’ describes 
a state of governance where the administrative 
apparatus is appointed by and responsible to the 
top leader (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2002). The 
concept is applied to a form of government that is 
structured around familial leadership, and governance 
mechanisms depend heavily on local cultural norms. 
Weber puts forward the opposite of patrimonialism 
as ‘modern’ governance, based on a rational–legal 
system, or bureaucracy, that accentuates the citizen 
as an individual, but also separates private and official 
affairs (Adams 2005). For rural Indonesian citizens 
living in villages, the possibility of active participation 
for accountable governance should not be assumed; 
the implementation of a new and progressive legal 
framework for governance will inevitably be shaped by 
contextual patrimonial norms.  
As well as providing a framework for potential citizen 
participation, the Village Law also provides village-
level governance actors with budgetary resources 
and legal decision-making authority – both sources of 
power. Using structuration theory (Giddens 1995) as a 
lens, such budgetary resources can be characterised 
as giving agency to local authorities – the power to 
act, exert power and produce an effect (Friedman 
and Starr 2002: 32); other factors that give actors 
agency include capability, motivation and knowledge. 
Legal decision-making authority, on the other hand, 
can be seen as the structure within which the local 
authorities exercise their agency. Following Giddens, 
we suggest that village finance (agency) and village 
governance (structure) are in a dialectic relationship. 
With particular relevance for accountable governance, 
we reflect on the way that different local governance 
actors exercise their agency, and how the interactions 
between them shape and reproduce the new structures 
offered by the Village Law. 
These concepts were used to frame the study, and 
examine the complex interplay of the factors needed to 
attain a self-empowered and prosperous village. With 
the new authority conferred on them by the Village 
Law, village heads have the power to undertake reforms 
that have a positive effect on local development. But 
in practice, for that authority to trigger change, other 
factors are needed: the capability to make a difference, 
motivation to change, knowledge of the village and the 
support of other actors.
Giddens argues that power is meaningful only when 
it is combined with the capability of an agent to make 
a difference. We also find it useful to draw from Nye 
(1990), who discusses the importance of soft power 
– the ability to persuade others to do what one wants 
without force or coercion – to complement hard power. 
Although Nye referred to soft power in the context of 
world politics, we deem it applicable for success in 
leadership in general – including in Indonesian villages. 
Courage is another a crucial factor in implementing 
initiatives for democratic change (Bulan 2013). It 
Village heads have the power to undertake reforms that have a positive effect 
on local development. But in practice, for that authority to trigger change, 
other factors are needed: the capability to make a difference, motivation to 
change, knowledge of the village and the support of other actors
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is needed when leaders must deal with obstacles 
that include entrenched structural barriers such 
as regulation, bureaucracy and budget availability. 
Bulan also notes that the ability of actors to build 
relationships with authorities at higher levels is a 
significant factor that shapes their agency.
The structure within which local governance actors 
exercise their agency can either constrain or enable 
their efforts to be accountable, depending on this 
dynamic relationship between structure and agent. 
For example, regulation is a form of structure that can 
sometimes discourage actors from exercising their 
agency to improve accountable governance practices; 
for others, the constraints of structure may even 
trigger the production of positive energy that can bring 
about reformist ideas. Equally, however, agency does not 
always comply with structure, because some actors can 
find opportunities to act beyond existing regulations or 
stipulations, or find loopholes in them.
1.3 Methodology
The researchers selected six villages as case studies, 
located in three regencies of three provinces.1 Three 
villages (one in each regency) were chosen as the 
primary sites for the study, and three villages as 
secondary sites. Information from the secondary sites 
was intended to enrich the data collected in the primary 
sites. The primary sites were purposively selected 
as examples of good practice in village governance. 
Secondary sites were chosen to provide a comparison 
with primary sites, in order to enrich the analysis. 
All six sites were also selected on the grounds of 
availability of information on the themes of the study. 
Table 1 provides key information on each site.
The research team gathered primary and secondary 
data, and undertook qualitative analysis. Primary data 
were collected through in-depth interviews, focus group 
discussions (FGDs), and observation of the speech 
and action of local governance actors. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed. Secondary data included 
written sources such as newspapers, documents, 
photographs and statistical data.
Data management was conducted by organising 
records, interview transcript data, log books and 
field notes. Preliminary analysis involved scanning 
for related words and contextual features in order to 
find the big ideas (Krueger 1998). The data were then 
categorised and interpreted to provide answers to the 
research questions.
The validity of collected data was ensured through 
triangulation – comparing and rechecking the
1 Indonesia is divided into 34 provinces, which in turn are made up of regencies and cities. Regencies are further sub-divided into 
districts and sub-districts.
credibility of information collected at different times  
and using different methods. This included comparison 
between observation data and interview transcripts; 
comparing what respondents said in public and 
private conversations; and comparing what was said in 
interviews with documents and media coverage of the 
same issue.
1.4 Research questions
This report discusses the findings that answer the 
following research questions: 
1. How is the Village Law – in terms of both village 
governance and village finance – implemented 
with regard to accountability and citizen 
participation? 
2. What factors contribute to the capability of local 
leaders or village heads in making pro-accountability 
reforms?
The study team at PATTIRO expected the research to 
bring both theoretical and practical benefits. In the 
theoretical realm, it adds to the literature on village or 
rural development in Indonesia, as well as scholarship 
on decentralisation policy and practice, particularly 
Village Law implementation. In the practical realm, 
as noted in section 1.1, the research was designed 
to lead to the formulation of recommendations for 
different government authorities for strengthening 
the implementation of the Village Law by addressing 
the problems and implementation gaps it identified. 
It was also intended for use by practitioners to gain 
a more comprehensive understanding of ground-
level implementation issues, which could feed into 
evidence-based advocacy for advancing village 
development. 
The study has limitations. It was conducted in only 
six villages within a short time-frame (two to three 
weeks), and thus provides only a partial picture of 
village governance. We focused on ground-level 
implementation, at the cost of examining the wider 
framework of legislative reform on village governance. 
Further, since the study focused on the practices 
in running village affairs, we collected data from 
village heads, village officials, members of Village 
Representative Councils, and district and sub-district 
governments. By focusing on their perspectives, 
we may be demonstrating personal, outsider bias 
(Chambers 1983). As outsiders, we were perhaps less 
sensitive to capturing the voices of village citizens. 
Further studies would be necessary to capture their 
perspective, and provide a more comprehensive 
assessment of the impact of the Village Law.
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Table 1. Key characteristics and village head profiles, primary and secondary research sites
Village District, 
regency and 
province
Indicator of good 
practice in governance
Profile of village head
Panggungharjo 
(primary site)
Bantul Regency, 
Yogyakarta 
Province
National Best Village 
(2014)
Wahyudi, a former pharmacist, thinks that there 
is not a single approach or formula for social 
innovation
Tirtonirmolo 
(secondary 
site)
Bantul Regency, 
Yogyakarta 
Province
Well-known for its 
economic and financial 
institutions, including 
cooperatives, banks 
and credit unions
Marwan has been serving his second term as 
village head since his re-election in 2014. 
Although he was reluctant to run for a second 
term, he had won public trust and the villagers 
paid for his election registration 
Tualang  
(primary site)
Siak Regency, 
Riau Province
National Safest Village 
(2012); known for 
good management 
performance of the 
village-owned 
enterprise
Juprianto has been serving his second term as 
village head since his re-election in 2015. His 
motivation when first elected at the age of 29 
was a desire to provide actual change for 
Tualang
Berumbung 
Baru 
(secondary 
site)
Siak Regency, 
Riau Province
Ministry of Home 
Affairs National Best 
Village for Data 
Management (2015) 
Sunarto has been serving his second term as 
village head since his re-election in 2013. He has 
helped to develop a village cooperative which 
has 500 members from 23 farmer groups 
Pejengkolan 
(primary site)
Kebumen 
Regency, 
Central Java 
Province
Ministry of Villages 
National Best Village 
for Empowerment and 
Development (2015)
Muslimah is the first female village head in 
Pejengkolan, currently serving her second term. 
At first she was reluctant to run for village head, 
but she was supported by villagers to stand 
against another candidate who had problems 
with financial management. In her first term, she 
recruited village officials through a rigorous 
selection process, and gave priority to young 
people with potential
Petanahan 
(secondary 
site)
Kebumen 
Regency, 
Central Java 
Province
Award-winning 
village-owned 
enterprise organised 
by coconut farmers
Warkhah is the first female village head in 
Petanahan. Initially she met with resistance from 
those whose interpretation of Islam forbade 
them from electing women leaders, but after 
gaining support from her extended family and 
other community members, she was elected by a 
landslide
2. Key aspects of the Village Law
2 New Order is the term used to refer to the Suharto regime, 1966–1998, and was coined by Suharto himself to distinguish his 
government from that of his predecessor Sukarno. 
Village governance in Indonesia has been shaped by 
different political regimes, which granted different 
types of authority to village-level government. In 
the Dutch colonial era, the village was recognised 
as an entity based on local customs and traditions, 
functioning without direct intervention from the 
central government. Under the New Order,2 which 
began in 1966, villages were centralised in a rigid, 
hierarchical structure. This era was characterised 
by patrimonialism, with central government 
exerting patronage and close political control over 
village governments; this was also reflected in the 
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relationship between state and citizens (Antlöv and 
Eko 2012). 
With the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 and 
the beginning of a reformist era, the Indonesian 
government initiated rapid decentralisation. 
International financial institutions heavily influenced 
this process, coming as it did in the wake of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis (Green 2005). In this era, Law 
No. 22 / 1999 (later replaced by Law No. 32 / 2004) 
granted a certain degree of autonomy to district-
level governments, and placed villages under their 
control. But this reform fell short of ensuring village 
self-empowerment, and merely shifted patronage from 
central government to district government (Vel 2008).
It was in 2014, with the introduction of the Village 
Law (The President of Indonesia 2014), that village 
governance acquired a new dimension, establishing 
villages as stand-alone administrative units with 
decision-making powers and budgets for the first time. 
The law is grounded on three main principles:
• the village has the right to regulate and manage the 
interests of the local community3
• the village needs to be self-empowered and 
democratic towards a thriving society4
• the village needs to be governed by an ad hoc 
legislation.5 
Among the many provisions the law makes, the most 
significant for enabling local accountability and 
citizens’ participation relate to village governance and 
village finance. 
With regard to village governance, the law establishes 
a hybrid model under which the village is part of the 
decentralised local government system on the one 
hand, and on the other, a self-governed community with 
“one village, one plan, one budget” – as summarised by 
a popular tagline.
3 Articles 3, 4 and 18–22. 
4 Articles 31–47 and 54–65.
5 Articles 69–70.
In terms of village finance, before the law, villages used 
to receive limited funding called Alokasi Dana Desa 
(ADD), from the revenue of regional government. The 
Village Law has established an additional source of 
funding for the village – Dana Desa (DD) – derived from 
central government. As a result, allocations to village 
budgets have increased around ten-fold.
2.1 Village governance
As noted above, the Village Law repositions the village 
as both a part of the decentralised local government 
system and as a self-governed community. The lowest 
level of autonomous government remains the district 
level, which means that village governments are still 
within the purview of the district administration, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
On the other hand, each village has its own citizens, 
areas, borders and local customs, and thus is defined 
by the Village Law as a community provided with 
the authority to regulate its own affairs. Therefore, 
the village is also considered to be a self-governed 
community, as shown in Figure 2. 
The Village Law constructs a village as a community 
with its own authorities, which are legally structured 
and regulated in five areas: village government, Village 
Representative Council, village consultative forum, 
monitoring and evaluation of village governance and 
planning, and creating new regulations. 
Village government comprises the village head, 
secretary, other officials in charge of various sections 
(governance, welfare and public service) and affairs 
(administration, finance and planning), and sub-village 
heads. While the role of village officials is administrative 
with no decision-making power, the village head enjoys 
several types of decision-making power, to:
• lead the governance of the village as a self-governed 
community
Figure 1. The village as part of the local government system
District head
Sub-district head
Village head Village head Village head
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Figure 2. The village as a self-governed community
Village head
Village secretary
Sub-village head Sub-village head Sub-village head
Local Custom 
Committee
Village Representative 
Council (BPD)
Governance 
section
Welfare 
section 
Public service 
section
Administrative 
affairs
Financial 
affairs
Planning 
affairs
• appoint and terminate the appointment of village 
officials
• take charge of village finance and related assets
• issue village-level regulations 
• coordinate village-level development through a 
participatory approach
• represent the village in court in any legal matters.
Beyond their institutional duties, village heads also play 
an informal role in mediating village-level disputes and 
settling them outside courts. Various disputes often 
occur among villagers, especially over land ownership 
and inheritance. 
The election of the village head – in which all adult 
villagers have the right to vote – is organised by an ad 
hoc committee composed of village officials, members 
of community organisations and community leaders, 
which is established by the Village Representative 
Council (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD). The 
elected village head serves the village government for 
an administrative term of up to six years. The position 
of village heads is terminated if the incumbent dies, 
requests termination or is dismissed. There are also 
administrative sanctions for village heads who do 
not perform their duties, which take the form of oral 
reprimands and / or written warnings. The law states 
that the district head has the authority to impose 
sanctions on village heads. 
Before appointing subordinate village officials, the 
village head must consult the sub-district head as 
a representative of the district head. Accountability 
for the performance of village officials can only be 
demanded only from the village head; their dismissal 
also falls under the authority of the village head. 
The BPD plays a key role in making good governance, 
because its existence is intended to serve as a control 
for the village head in running the village administration. 
While Figure 2 shows that the relationship between the 
village head and Local Custom Committee is based on 
partnership (shown by the green line), the relationship 
between the village head and the BPD is consultative 
rather than instructive (represented by the dashed line). 
The BPD has three key functions: 
• discuss with and give approval to village head 
regarding drafts of village regulations
• solicit the community’s aspirations and channel 
them to the village government
• oversee the performance of the village government.
Given its role of providing checks and balances on 
village government, the BPD must be representative 
of different groups and interests in all sub-villages 
(for instance, civil society organisations, faith-based 
organisations, community figures and local leaders). 
Village officials cannot serve as members of the BPD. 
The selection of members should be democratic, by 
direct elections, by neighbourhood leaders, or through 
representative deliberation.
The village consultative forum (Musdes) is a 
consultative space for citizen participation established 
under the Ministerial Decree issued by the Villages, 
Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration Ministry 
in 2015. The decree states that the BPD should form 
a smaller committee to run this forum, chaired by 
the head of the BPD and composed of BPD members, 
village government, community members and 
facilitators, and representatives of village residents 
such as religious leaders, community figures, women’s 
groups and farmers’ groups. 
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Musdes are intended to produce long-term and annual 
village programmatic and budget plans, and should be 
held at least once a year. They can also be convened 
on an ad hoc basis, to deliberate about strategic 
issues related to village governance: administration, 
partnership with other actors, economic development 
and other urgent issues.
Although some monitoring and evaluation processes 
for village-level governance are in place, it is not 
clearly stated in the Village Law how accountability 
for the implementation of village-level governance 
is to be pursued. At the end of each fiscal year, the 
village head is expected to submit a report to the BPD 
and the district government on the implementation of 
village governance, but there is no clause regarding 
the authority of the BPD or the village community to 
provide feedback on the report. Other than this report, 
an opportunity for the accountable implementation 
of village governance exists in the Village Law 
stipulation of the right of village citizens to obtain 
information about the village development plan and its 
implementation.
Complementing the village’s function as a self-
governing community, the Village Law also gives 
authority to the village to issue legally binding village 
regulations on a range of issues. The drafting of village 
regulations is carried out by the village government 
with the BPD, and then opened for public consultation. 
Draft laws on village budget, levies, spatial planning 
and the organisation of village government must 
be evaluated by the district head. However, the law 
does not provide for a clear mechanism for citizens 
to provide feedback on the implementation of local 
regulations.
Based on this understanding of the key aspects of 
village governance defined by the Village Law, for 
the purposes of the study we defined ‘good village 
governance’ as governance that meets the following 
three criteria: 
1. The Musdes is held in a way that ensures citizen 
participation, with adequate representation of all 
elements of the community, and decisions made 
through consultation with the community.
2. An annual performance report of village government 
is produced and openly shared with citizens at the 
Musdes every year.
3. The BPD fulfils all three of its functions, outlined 
above.
2.2 Village finance
As discussed above, the Village Law has increased 
village revenue, which is now drawn both directly from 
the national state budget (DD), and via the district 
budget (ADD). 
The DD is allocated on the basis of the population, 
poverty level, land area and geographical difficulty 
of each village. Its fund is tied to expenditure in two 
areas: village development (including infrastructural 
improvement, economic development and 
environmental activities) and community empowerment 
(including capacity-building of community members 
and village government). 
The ADD comes to villages via the district government, 
which transfers to each village a proportion of the 
General Allocation Fund for District Government 
received from national government. The ADD is 
allocated to village development.
Based on this understanding of village finance 
defined in the Village Law, and on interviews with key 
informants, for the purposes of the study we defined 
‘good village finance’ as governance that meets the 
following three criteria: 
1. The village budget (both DD and ADD) is used to 
fund village development that meets the needs of 
every section of the community, including groups 
that are often marginalised, such as women, 
children, the elderly and people with disability. 
2. The design of the village budget is undertaken in a 
way that ensures citizen participation in decision-
making, with each section of the community 
adequately represented.
3. The management of village finance is transparent 
and accountable, with the public provision of 
financial reports on budget use.
3. Research findings
3.1 Village governance 
Among the issues of citizen participation and 
accountability touched by the Village Law, we present 
findings that highlight four areas of village governance: 
the direct election of the village head and officials 
by community members; the existence of the BPD; 
the existence of the Musdes for accommodating the 
aspirations of the village community; and the process 
for monitoring and evaluating village governance. In 
addition to these issues, we also highlight the overall 
performance of village heads to identify factors that 
influence their capability to make a difference for good 
governance. 
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Election of the village head and appointment 
of village officials 
Our findings show two main problems in the election 
process. First, apart from the establishment of 
a committee composed of particular sections of 
the community to organise elections, the role of 
citizens in monitoring the election of village heads 
and officials is not clear. The Village Law does not 
give village citizens the opportunity to monitor the 
election of a village head, and only district heads 
can legalise the appointment of village heads, and 
dismiss them. In practice, strong dependence on 
district-level regulations on village head elections, and 
direct interference from the sub-district and district 
governments in the appointment of village heads, show 
that the role of citizens in this process is still weak.
The second issue concerns the autonomy of the 
election organisation committee in carrying out its 
responsibilities. According to Village Law, this committee 
– established by the BPD – has the autonomy to organise 
the election without intervention from other actors. But 
district government actors have the power to intervene 
in the screening process of candidates. The sub-
district government can also intervene in monitoring, 
assisting and supervising the election. For instance, in 
Siak district, according to district government rules, 
candidates had to take a test in reciting the Holy Qur’an. 
In some cases, the committee is formed by the sub-
district government, and any violation of regulations is 
noted by the sub-district government and then settled 
by Regent; this means that some committees lack 
the political will to resolve problems on their own. For 
instance, the committee of Berumbung village needed 
to consult with sub-district and district government in 
order to deal with a protest from a candidate who did 
not pass the screening process. 
Although not prescribed by the Village Law, the newly 
elected village head usually maintains village officials 
from the previous administration. New village officials 
are then selected if there are empty posts to fill, or to 
replace officials who have retired. However, we found 
one village head who was not brave enough to appoint 
new village officials even though there were some 
vacant posts because she was not sure if the Village 
Law gave her the legitimacy to do so. When appointing 
new village officials, a village head forms an ad hoc 
team that announces the vacancy to all sub-villages, 
screens the applicants and conducts an exam for 
candidates – a written test about village administration 
and management. After getting the shortlisted 
candidates’ names, the team submits a report to the 
village head. The village head then delivers this to 
the BPD and asks the sub-district government (as 
a representative of the district head) to release the 
recommendation letters required to appoint officials. 
This study finds that although village officials usually 
meet the requirement of the Village Law that all sub-
villages are included in the selection of new village 
officials, in general the views and decisions of selected 
officials are heavily aligned to those of the village head. 
Village Representative Council (BPD) 
For electing BPD members, the village head establishes 
a committee to organise and conduct BPD membership 
elections in sub-villages. Despite the important role 
of the BPD in making sure that village governance is 
conducted in a democratic and accountable way, we 
found that fewer candidates put themselves forward 
to be elected as BPD members than for village head 
elections. We also found that the district heads can 
legalise the appointment of BPD members, and dismiss 
them.
In carrying out its function of accommodating the 
aspirations of villagers as citizens, we found variations 
in the BPD’s effectiveness in fulfilling its roles. In some 
cases, the BPD is directly involved in the Musdes to 
discuss the village budget, the annual village work 
plan and the medium-term village development plan. 
In others, the BPD also participates in addressing 
community proposals and discussing them with the 
village government. In other cases, where the BPD 
is not functioning optimally, we found villagers were 
expressing their aspirations via other channels. 
In Panggungharjo, the village head has assigned 
household rubbish collectors the role of collecting 
citizens’ aspirations and complaints. According to him, 
this mechanism once enabled the village government to 
address a community problem with moneylenders.
Regarding the monitoring of the village head’s 
performance, we found that there were regular 
communications between BPDs and village 
governments, since the BPD holds the budget 
allocation for village government meetings and 
administrative support. BPDs do some monitoring 
of village government, but this is limited to checking 
on the physical implementation of development 
projects, rather than comprehensive monitoring of 
the consistency of implementation with the material 
specifications of the planning document. In some 
cases, the BPD gives hardly any feedback or response 
to the reports submitted by the village head. Further, 
village heads place higher value on their reports to the 
district government, as these have implications for the 
approval of the next disbursement of village funds. 
On the legislative function, the BPD should work to pass 
the village regulations proposed by village head. This 
research found that the BPDs in most of the selected 
villages did not perform this function, because the 
village heads were not initiating changes in village 
regulations. However, we found that in practice it is 
sometimes the BPD, rather than the village head, that 
proposes such regulations. 
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Overall, we found that the general performance of 
the BPD as a village representative council is less 
than optimal, for several reasons. First, there is no 
complete regulation on how to report and channel 
citizens’ aspirations to the BPD; many people prefer 
to express their aspirations to people whom they 
consider to be close to the village head, in the hope 
that they will be delivered direct to the head. Second, 
the capacity of BPD members is not adequate to fulfil 
their responsibilities and perform their own managerial 
and administrative tasks. BPDs lack standard 
operating procedures and institutional solidity; as a 
result most BPD members are largely inactive. Third, 
village governments seem not to have trust in the 
BPD, tending to ask for recommendations from the 
district government instead. For instance, the head of 
Berumbung Baru village was going to use the village 
budget to build a meeting hall, and consulted with the 
district-level government instead of with the BPD. 
Existence of the village consultative forum 
(Musdes)
Regulations for the Musdes allow only representatives 
of the community to participate; it is not open 
to all citizens. This study found that community 
representatives who attend the Musdes are religous 
leaders, community leaders, village organisations 
for women and youth, neighbourhood group leaders 
and sub-village heads. However, the quality of the 
village meetings is variable; the priorities for village 
development were rarely considered, and many urgent 
matters were decided solely by the village head. For 
instance, in some cases village development plans were 
pre-prepared by the village head, and the participants 
of the Musdes approved them without deliberation. 
Although the Village Law stipulates6 that village 
governments must report on the implementation of 
village development in Musdes, giving villagers the 
opportunity to respond, we found that this did not 
occur in any of the six study villages.
Monitoring and evaluation of village 
governance
Although the Village Law gives citizens rights to 
monitor village governance, in general there is 
little evidence of citizen participation in monitoring. 
With regard to transparency in disclosing relevant 
information on the functioning of the village 
government, the village head makes regular reports 
on village governance only to the BPD and the district 
government, but has no obligation to make this public. 
Even in cases when village leaders proactively deliver 
information about village governance to citizens, the 
channel established for providing feedback is the 
Musdes, whose formal structure does not provide a 
6 Article 82, paragraphs 4 and 5.
real opportunity to discuss, criticise or engage with the 
information available. This indicates a tendency among 
these village governments towards administrative 
rather than social accountability. 
The overall performance of village heads
In Petanahan village, the performance of village head is 
strongly associated with her excellent communication 
skills, particularly in her relationships with district 
government and local members of parliament. 
Her strong capacity in this area often results in 
Petanahan village being prioritised for the government 
programmes, as reflected in its infrastructural 
development, which is more rapid compared with that 
in other villages. 
The village head of Pejengkolan is fairly responsive to 
recommendations made by various parties, especially 
the BPD. For example, a problem arose with distribution 
of subsidised rice and cash for the poor, with many 
residents complaining that they did not receive the aid. 
The village head initiated a discussion with the BPD 
and community to address the issue. This revealed 
that the problem lay in inaccurate data collection. In 
response, the village formed a rural poverty alleviation 
acceleration coordinating team, whose job is to collect 
data on the poor by participative means, so that the 
community would not question it. With more objective 
data, those citizens who do not get aid no longer 
complain, because according to the team’s data, those 
people are not counted as poor. The team is focused on 
accelerating poverty reduction at the village level, and 
is protected legally by decree of the village head. 
Meanwhile, the Panggungharjo village head encourages 
community participation in monitoring the delivery of 
public services through technology-enabled reporting. 
Citizens can file complaints with regard to the delivery 
of public services through a number of platforms, 
including a short message service (SMS) gateway, 
social media and a village website. Complaints are 
responded to in less than 24 hours and supported by 
bureaucratic reforms of the village officials. Compared 
with other villages, Panggungharjo government is good 
at initiatives that deliver public services to its villagers 
– such as the formation of a dispute settlement 
institution, and a scholarship scheme for poor students 
– although there are no specific regulations on such 
public services. 
Panggungharjo village government does not hesitate 
to engage with a range of agencies to support its 
performance – from working with the National Archive 
Office to document village assets and to archive village 
documents, to cooperating with the BPKP (financial and 
development monitoring agency) to ensure the village’s 
financial reporting system runs well. This engagement 
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with diverse agencies is an important element in 
fostering the good performance of this village’s 
goverment. 
In Tirtonirmolo, the village head always tries to fulfil 
the role of mediator among the villagers. He invites 
disputing parties to sit together, accompanied by 
police, so that the problems are resolved without 
having to go to court. Criminal cases, fights and small-
scale disputes on inheritance are successfully managed 
and resolved at the village level, and some cases of 
domestic violence have also been mediated. 
In Berumbung village, the village head extended 
the working times of local officers in an attempt to 
restore public trust for the village government. During 
the previous administration period, the office was 
open only three times a week, with limited hours of 
operation. Nowadays, the village head requires his staff 
to go to the office every day, and stay all morning; he 
also believes that the main agents for assessing village 
government performance are community members 
themselves. 
For the Tualang village head, the benchmark of good 
village government performance is the existence 
of a safe situation where there are no conflicts or 
complaints. To achieve this, he strives to create an 
environment conducive to discussion and problem-
solving; the village office, for instance, has become a 
space where citizens and officials hold discussions and 
resolve problems. He also believes that the role of the 
village government is very important, so he supports 
policies that favour fair remuneration of village officials, 
which allows them to perform well.
3.2 Village finance 
The dual-source funding model for village governance 
– the regional government ADD fund and the central 
government DD fund – has had mixed consequences for 
village government. Village officials, including village 
heads, complain about the bureaucratic burden of a 
dual financial disbursement process and reporting 
structure, and voice a fear that failing to comply 
with the rules may lead the user to be scrutinised by 
Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK). 
We found variations in both the allocation of financial 
resources and in the mechanism of disbursement. 
Different villages allocate their DD funding to different 
‘sections’ (see Figure 2). Panggungharjo village, for 
example, used its DD resources to fund two officials 
working on development and empowerment, while 
Tualang used the budget entirely for infrastructure 
development. 
Although the allocation of the ADD and DD varies 
widely from one village to another, ADD funds had 
increased across the board since the enactment of 
the Village Law. Pejengkolan village, for example, 
previously received Rp 78 million (around USD 5,800) 
of ADD, which rose to Rp 244 million (USD 18,000) 
in 2015 after the enactment of the Village Law; in 
Petanahan, ADD resources increased from Rp 70 million 
(USD 5,200) to Rp 275 million (USD 20,400). In this 
way, the Village Law strengthens village finance. 
National regulations on fund distribution processes 
state that disbursement mechanisms for the ADD and 
DD are regulated at the district level, but we found 
a different mechanism of ADD disbursement in each 
of the three districts where we worked. In Kebumen 
district, disbursement is carried out in two phases 
a year, and in Siak, three phases. But in Bantul, 
disbursement is monthly. 
We found obstacles – on both the demand (the 
village government) and supply (the governments at 
sub-district and district level) sides – to ADD and DD 
disbursement. 
On the demand side, we found some instances of 
tardy submission of the two separate audited financial 
reports of expenditure of previous payments needed 
to trigger the next disbursement. However, the head of 
Petanahan village pointed out that there had been no 
problems in the disbursement of DD and ADD, once he 
had completed the required documents.
Also on the demand side, we found different 
interpretations of what needed to be submitted. A 
village head in Bantul district said that in his view, 
document verification and submission of requests as a 
prerequisite to receiving ADD were unnecessary, since 
as a village head he was entitled to receive it. 
On the supply side, there are three major problems. 
First, the verification of prerequisite documents 
sent from villages – the responsibility of the sub-
district government – is very often time-consuming 
and arduous. Delays at this level postpone the 
implementation of village-level development 
programmes. To this extent, the head of the sub-
district plays a key role in village finance, developing 
The dual-source funding model for village governance – the regional 
government ADD fund and the central government DD fund – has had mixed 
consequences for village government
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directions and guiding the process for the district 
government. 
Local regulations in each district of this research 
project dictate that the sub-district head acts as an 
examiner and evaluator of village documents submitted 
for verification in advance of financial reports and 
requests for new funds. Yet, the sub-district head does 
not receive any instrument or guidance from the district 
about the task of verifying or evaluating documents. So 
methods of verification are variable – or, in the words of 
village heads, “random”. 
The second problem in receiving ADD and DD is multiple 
disbursements at different times – meaning that village 
governments have to start preparing the next set of 
documents as soon as they have received a payment. 
Their time is consumed by administrative tasks, 
particularly those with monthly disbursements. 
The third problem is cash shortage. The district 
government appoints organisations like credit providers 
to disburse funds, but sometimes they simply run out of 
cash. This has led to many reports of delayed payments 
of both DD and ADD.
4. Discussion
4.1 The Village Law: an enabler 
and a constraint to change 
In some views, social structures are sets of rules that 
principally constrain human action, even though they 
are created by people (Lamsal 2012). As discussed 
in section 1.2, Giddens believes that structure is not 
always a constraint, but rather that structures change 
when people exercise their agency by ignoring or 
replacing them, or by reproducing them differently 
(Gauntlett 2002). 
In this research, we found that the Village Law can 
be both enabling and constraining in making positive 
changes or reforms towards more accountable 
governance. On one hand, the law can be regarded as 
an enabler, because in general, its stipulations have 
encouraged some village reforms, in comparison with 
the law that preceded it. On the other hand, the law 
also stipulates that village governments must send 
reports to district governments. This stipulation creates 
a complex reporting burden which constrains village 
governments from optimising their village development 
programmes. 
As far as the practices of electing village heads are 
concerned, we consider that the Village Law structure 
is enabling for reformist change. In this scenario, the 
‘agents’ – the committee for village head election – feel 
comfortable with the norms as stated in the Village 
Law, including those that give authority to district 
government to play an active role, and therefore they 
comply with the regulations. Election committees in the 
villages where we worked have in general done a good 
job of gathering candidates, collecting voter data and 
counting votes, independent of district intervention in 
the running of the election. District regulations have an 
important role in guiding the committee, or assisting if 
they face problems. The reported smooth functioning 
of the village elections in our six sites represents an 
achievement of accountable governance, which was 
enabled by the legislation.
In cases where there was little evidence that the BPD – 
as a Village Representative Council – was channelling 
the community’s aspirations, we consider that the 
lack of regulation poses a constraint for developing 
more accountable processes. It is the perception of 
some village government actors, derived from the 
Village Law itself, that the district government is more 
important than the BPD, which means that the BPD 
lacks adequate agency to perform its role optimally. 
We contend that if the authority of the BPD were more 
clearly defined in legal terms, they may be enabled to 
fulfil their role more effectively.
Our findings also show that the absence of local 
regulations or district involvement can be an obstacle 
for village heads if they try to innovate or take action. 
For instance, consider the case of the village head who 
was reluctant to fill vacant village official posts because 
the Village Law does not specifically tell her to do so. 
By contrast, the head of Panggungharjo village has 
the confidence – founded in his belief that the Village 
Law gives the village substantial discretion to act 
independently – to take initiatives on his own, despite 
the absence of local government regulation; this has 
led to the village charting some achievements, such 
as the adoption of a performance-based remuneration 
system. 
With regard to village finance, the new layer of 
‘structure’ represented by the procedures entailed in 
the disbursement mechanism of both the DD and the 
ADD – which are burdensome, time-consuming and 
arduous – are a constraint for village governments, 
distracting their energies from the implementation of 
development programmes to meet community needs.
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4.2 The hybrid village: a self-
governed community and a part of 
the local government system
The Village Law repositions the village as a hybrid 
– both a self-governed community and a part of the 
decentralised local government system. But what role 
does the Village Law play as a supporting structure 
for local democracy, run by and prioritising the needs 
of the village community, rather than the district 
government?
Our findings suggest that citizen participation within 
the framework of the Village Law is not optimum, for 
three reasons. First, the law itself does not provide 
opportunities for all village citizens to be involved in 
monitoring village elections. 
Second, according to the law, the Musdes allows 
representatives of only particular sections of the 
community to participate, therefore excluding many 
others. This illustrates how the design of the law – 
the ‘structure’ in our conceptual framework – acts 
as a constraint to the development of accountable 
governance. The design of the law also limits the 
authority of ‘the village’ with regard to the district 
authorities, acting as a constraint to self-government. 
Third, the implementation of the law in practice limits 
the authority of ‘the village’. District government 
retains the right both to approve and to terminate 
the appointment of village heads and BPD members; 
village heads are obliged to consult sub-district heads 
before appointing village officials; district heads 
must evaluate draft village-level regulations; district 
government retains the right to settle elections; and 
district priorities shape the disbursement mechanisms 
for village finance. In total, these aspects of the Village 
Law mean that district government continues to play 
a dominant role in both village governance and village 
finance. Here, both the design and the implementation 
of the law in practice present constraints to 
independent village-level governance based on 
community priorities.
The function of the village as a self-governed 
community, as envisaged by the Village Law, is not 
yet clearly understood or implemented in village 
governance processes; in practice, the function of the 
village as a part of a decentralised local government 
system remains the dominant half of the hybrid 
model. This is attributable both to the intervention of 
district government and to the dependency of village 
government on district government, as depicted in 
Figure 3. This dependency / interference dynamic 
must be viewed within the historical context of the 
patrimonialism discussed above (section 1.2), which 
shapes the prospects for and determines the pace of 
development of village authority.
4.3 What influences the agency of 
village heads? 
With regard to the overall performance of village heads, 
we examine factors contributing to ‘agency’ – that 
is, the capability of an agent to make a difference 
(Giddens 1995). Our study found that village 
government – despite the ‘interference’ of district 
government (discussed in 4.2) – does indeed have a 
central role in governing village affairs. Most issues 
related to village development depend in one way or 
another on village government, and particularly on 
the village head, who in Giddens’ framework is the 
‘power-holder’. The relative dominance of the village 
head derives largely from the fact that the BPD has 
not been able to fulfil the role of balancing institution 
that the Village Law envisages. In the six villages, BPD 
members seem unclear about articulating the existence 
and function of their council in village democracy, 
in the absence of regulations about this. Many BPD 
members interpret their institution as the village head’s 
partner in implementing development – rather than as 
a monitoring or supervising institution that engages 
in critical thinking about what development means, or 
what the priorities for achieving it are. 
In this study, the six individual village leaders 
interviewed all demonstrated a positive mindset 
towards achieving high-quality democracy; this is 
an enabling force for active citizenship, because of 
the relative power of the village head. Good practice 
around active citizenship happens and grows because 
of the combination of various factors that contribute to 
Figure 3. The power relationship between the village government and district government
Village 
government
District 
government
Interference
Dependency
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a village head pursuing a path that maximises village 
democracy and active citizenship: 
• strong personal willingness to improve villages, and 
a commitment to change processes
• openness to ‘modern’ values in village governance 
(transparency, professionalism, accountability)
• teamwork, especially between village heads and 
village officials
• ability of the village head in developing the village 
administration in a way that fits local values.
Table 2 shows how these four factors were mapped 
across the village heads interviewed in the study. 
All these factors need not necessarily be present at 
the same time. It can be inferred from Table 2 that the 
village heads of Brumbungbaru and Panggungharjo 
do possess all four factors, and they also made the 
most significant changes during their administrations, 
compared with the heads of the other villages. However, 
the two most prevalent factors among the interviewees 
are strong willingness and commitment towards 
positive change and the ability to adjust approaches 
and policies with the local values. 
5. Recommendations and creating 
space for research uptake
5.1 Conclusions and 
recommendations 
The research findings show that the Village Law serves 
both as an enabler of and a constraint to making 
pro-accountability changes or reforms, depending on 
the case. Broadly, the law has both an enabling and 
constraining role in village governance, but is identified 
more as a constraint in the practice of village finance. 
In that arena, the complex regulations for village 
finance entailed in the Village Law consume village 
governments’ time with administrative work at the 
expense of implementing their village development 
programmes. 
In the implementation of the Village Law, we find a 
strong association between a village’s dependency 
on the district government and district government 
interventions in most villages. This condition – a 
consequence of the structure of the Village Law in 
framing the village as a hybrid of a self-governed 
community and as part of a decentralised local 
government system – is inevitable. The research 
has shown that the function of the village as a 
part of a decentralised local government system is 
more dominant than its function as a self-governed 
community.
The Village Law, through acknowledging the rights and 
authority of the village, is intended to give villagers 
opportunities and power to influence the governance 
of their own affairs. However, in many cases we found 
that such opportunities could not be realised without 
the support of the village head, who still often holds 
the key to village reform, but needs courage to use it 
without fear of attracting intervention from the district 
government. 
The enactment of the Village Law has opened up space 
for citizen participation as an element of democracy. 
Democracy thus comes to depend to a degree on the 
Table 2. Presence of key factors among village head interviewees
Willingness and 
commitment 
Openness to new 
values
Teamwork Ability to fit with 
local values
Petanahan × ×
Pejengkolan × × × ×
Brumbungbaru × × × ×
Tualang × ×
Panggungharjo × × × ×
Tirtonirmolo ×
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performance of village government. The assumption is 
that good performance will build public trust in village 
governments, from which public awareness of village 
democracy will grow. However, our study shows that 
village democracy is not yet clearly visible. There were 
some indicators of low-quality democracy, where the 
potential for citizen participation had not been realised. 
These included the failure of the BPD to fully occupy 
its role as a representative council of citizens, and as a 
check-and-balance to village government; and the lack 
of villagers’ understanding of the new spirit of active 
citizenship endorsed by the law. Even in places where 
village heads had modelled active citizenship, the 
monitoring of village governance activities mandated 
by the Village Law was still lacking.
Based on the findings and what they imply for 
the possibilities of improving the implementation 
of the Village Law, PATTIRO offered some sets of 
recommendations for the government at the central, 
district and village level.
Village governance
1. Village government has to improve the quality of 
Musdes meetings by encouraging participants 
to be more active, improving decision-making 
mechanisms, and encouraging village heads towards 
social as well as administrative accountability.
2. District government should formulate clear guidance 
to distinguish the district government authority 
and village autonomy. This kind of guidance would 
provide greater margin for village adminstrations 
to improve their function as self-governing 
communities. 
3. The role of district government in providing capacity-
building assistance should not be targeted only 
at village governments, but also at BPD members, 
who often lack understanding of both the concept 
of village-level democracy and its implementation 
practices.
Village finance 
1. Central government should establish standardised 
regulations for the disbursement schedules of ADD 
funds, to ensure that district government releases 
these in a timely manner. 
2. Central government should regulate synchronised 
reporting for both ADD and DD village funds, so that 
the village governments can make a unified financial 
report, reducing their administrative burden.
3. District government should assist the village 
government in managing village administration. 
4. The head of sub-district must be equipped with 
job descriptions and operational guidelines for 
conducting evaluation of village-level regulations 
and village budgets. District government 
should provide such guidelines in order to give 
clearer boundaries to the power of sub-district 
governments in implementing delegated tasks, as its 
representative at sub-district level.
5. District governments should be more concerned with 
strengthening human resources for implementing 
tasks delegated to the sub-district level of 
government: in selecting village officials, evaluating 
village budgets, assisting and monitoring village 
governments.
5.2 Using the findings to influence 
Village Law implementation
As noted in Section 1.1, the overall change intended 
from the research and uptake process was a 
substantive improvement in the implementation of the 
Village Law.
Once the recommendations presented in Section 5.1 
were formulated, PATTIRO engaged with governance 
stakeholders in both offline and online spaces. The 
engagement strategy was geared towards ‘closing the 
feedback loop’ of the research – as part of the action–
reflection cycle of participatory enquiry – with the 
ultimate aim of making the implementation of the law 
more accountable. 
In the offline space, PATTIRO has convened several 
discussions to share knowledge about village 
governance – including the role of the BPD in 
encouraging village democracy, the role of the district 
in implementing the Village Law, and village financial 
management. The crucial issues that arise from these 
discussions are then submitted to the government in 
order to be considered in policy deliberations.
In the online space, an active WhatsApp group has also 
been established for sharing experiences and learning 
among participants in the discussions. PATTIRO 
developed a website, kedesa.id, designed to share 
information on the Village Law and get feedback from 
community members and local village authorities on 
the implementation challenges they face. Users can 
upload content and latest updates about Village Law 
implementation on the ground. The communication 
flow relates to substantive aspects of the law’s 
implementation, and to facilitating the exchange of 
information crucial to local actors. 
The opening of these spaces for reflection and 
discussion triggered a number of direct effects on policy, 
and influential inputs to related ongoing processes of 
decentralised accountable governance initiatives. 
• Changes in practice – During the research period, 
Indonesia’s activities under the Open Government 
Partnership (OGP) saw the government launch 
a pilot project to build the capacity of local 
governments and communities to implement the 
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Village Law. The pilot was finalised following a 
consultation with PATTIRO that highlighted the lack 
of adequate local government know-how and the 
lack of adequate information available to citizens. 
• Changes in policy – Under OGP commitments, the 
Indonesian government has developed a draft policy 
to standardise the information on the Village Law 
that is disclosed by local governments. This policy 
incorporated findings from the research, focusing 
on the need to revise the policy to make it more 
comprehensive (standards of information extended 
to village assemblies) and accessible (changes in 
language and formulation of certain sections).
• Changes in decision-making processes – The 
discussion spaces for local governance stakeholders 
opened up by the research process allowed them 
to develop clarity on specific aspects of the Village 
Law that had thus far remained unclear to both 
local governments and civil society groups, creating 
opportunities to meet and discuss these questions 
without being constrained by bureaucracy and 
hierarchy; village heads were also able to discuss 
these questions directly with ministry officials. 
PATTIRO is now working to keep spaces for change 
open in the longer term, to continue to build the 
knowledge of local governance stakeholders about 
Village Law implementation. The website was initially 
much less popular than the offline and mobile spaces. 
An action research enquiry aimed to find out why this 
was the case and to adjust PATTIRO’s strategy; a user 
survey pointed to a number of false assumptions about 
how the platform would be used. For more effective 
use of the platform, this enquiry highlighted the need 
for intermediaries to proactively collect feedback 
from people, and upload it online; for a wide network 
of intermediaries, beyond PATTIRO’s staff, to get 
involved; and for the need to identify champions and 
interlocutors within local governments who can act on 
the feedback provided. 
This in turn led to the development of PATTIRO’s 
current strategy for encouraging effective use of the 
platform which includes engaging with young people 
as content creators, through Village Youth Forums; 
building a network of CSOs that can play a role in 
documenting and tracking cases of implementation; 
and considering ways to combine the online platform 
with radio. 
These efforts continue in the belief that the potential 
for the law to significantly strengthen community 
participation in village-level governance remains 
untapped.
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